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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SCM LAND COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-Respondent-
Cross Appellant, 
Case No. 19172 
WATKINS & FABER, and WALTER P. 
FABER, JR., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
SCM Land sued Watkins & Faber for its breach of a written 
real property lease agreement. Watkins & Faber claims its 
breach is excused by an unperformed oral promise made by SCM 
Land's predecessor-in-interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court ruled that Watkins & Faber breached its 
written lease agreement. It also ruled that this breach 
would not be excused unless Watkins & Faber established a 
breached oral contract which was a condition precedent to the 
written lease agreement. The factual issues relating to this 
defense and the damage issues were submitted to the jury. 
The jury returned a special verdict for SCM Land finding 
that there was no oral contract. The jury also determined 
that if there was such an oral contract, it was not a condi-
tion precedent to the written lease agreement, it was not 
breached, and Watkins & Faber did not act within a reasonable 
time after the alleged breach of the oral contract. 
Judgment was entered against Watkins & Faber for $15,000 
damages, together with prejudgment interest of $2,309.86 and 
attorney's fees and costs of $7,034.47. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
SCM Land requests that the judgment based upon the jury 
verdict be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
SCM Land controverts Watkins & Faber's Statement of Facts 
and submits its own statement for the following reasons: 
(a) Watkins & Faber has selected evidence in dero-
gation of the jury verdict on liability and damages. As the 
prevailing party, SCM Land is entitled to have the evidence 
viewed by this Court in support of the jury verdict. 
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(b) Material facts have been omitted. 
(c) Facts have been mischaracterized. 
Watkins & Faber began leasing office space in the New-
house Building in 1967. (R. 290) On June 30, 1979, Watkins 
& Faber's written lease agreement for Suite 606 on the 6th 
floor expired. (R. 290-291) On July 9, 1979, Watkins & 
Faber executed a renewal lease agreement for Suite 606 with 
Richard Fischer, the owner of the Newhouse Building at that 
time. (Exhibit 2-P, R. 290-298) 
Fifteen months later in September 1980, SCM Land pur-
chased the Newhouse Building from Mr. Fischer. (R. 187) At 
that time, Watkins & Faber occupied Suite 606 under their 
written lease agreement. (R. 238-239) SCM Land was not 
aware of any claim by Watkins & Faber to space on the 6th 
floor other than Suite 606. (R. 190, 192, 193) 
After SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building, it 
entered into a long-term written lease agreement with I.M.L. 
for the 6th floor excluding Suite 606. (R. 304, 305) Subse-
quently, Watkins & Faber told SCM Land that Fischer had 
orally promised them some of I.M.L.'s space on the 6th 
floor. (R. 305) Since I.M.L. already had that space, SCM 
Land offered Watkins & Faber the entire 4th floor in place of 
Suite 606 or the option of keeping Suite 606 and taking addi-
tional space on another floor. (R. 307-308) Watkins & Faber 
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rejected both of these offers and vacated Suite 606 in March 
1981, fifteen months before their lease expired. 
"2-P", R. 307-312). 
(Exhibit 
Fischer's alleged oral promise which Watkins & Faber 
brought to SCM Land's attention after the space was leased to 
I.M.L. on a long-term basis, was made shortly before the 
renewal lease was executed. (R. 297, 298) Fischer promised 
that "when I.M.L. moved" from the 6th Floor, he would enter 
into a written lease agreement with Watkins & Faber for addi-
tional space on the 6th Floor. (R. 274, 276, 314) I.M.L. 
never moved. (R. 304, 305) Nor did Fischer ever promise to 
evict I.M.L. to give Wakins & Faber additional space. (R. 
275) Furthermore, Fischer never aqreed on what additional 
space would be leased, the lease term, the price, other than 
the going rate, or who would pay for necessary remodeling. 
(R. 275, 276) 
When Watkins & Faber executed the renewal lease, no men-
tion was made that the alleged oral promise was a prerequi-
site to the execution of the written lease agreement. (R. 
278) The written lease agreement not only fails to show that 
Fischer's alleged oral promise was a prerequisite to exe-
cuting the lease, but is devoid of any reference to the 
alleged promise. (Exhibit 2-P) The lease aqreement was a 
pre-printed form which had blanks filled in with negotiated 
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terms. In addition, there were three initialed handwritten 
chanaes concerning annual rent increases, the lease term, and 
real property tax obligations. (Exhibit ("2-P", R. 314-316) 
In the space provided for additional terms, no mention was 
made of this "critical" alleged oral promise. 
"2-P", R. 314-316) 
(Exhibit 
Although Watkins & Faber claims that Fischer promised to 
"enter into a written lease agreement for additional space on 
the sixth floor by at least December 1979," December passed 
without the execution of the written agreement for additional 
space. (R. 314) Watkins & Faber never made a demand on 
Fischer to perform. (R. 238) Instead they waited nine 
months before making a demand and then made it on a purchaser 
that knew nothing of the alleged oral promise and that had 
already leased the space to its longstanding occupant. (R. 
3 0 5) 
After Watkins & Faber vacated Suite 606 in March 1981, 
SCM Land made substantial efforts to relet the space. (R. 
200, 207-208) By October 1981, SCM Land had not succeeded in 
reletting Suite 606. To minimize its rental loss, SCM Land 
allowed an existing tenant, Norwest Resource Consultants, out 
of its lease for Suite 305 so that it could occupy a portion 
of Suite 606 at a higher rental. (R. 208-211) This 
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decreased the net rental loss by $495 per month and left 
Suite 305 and a part of Suite 606 vacant. (R. 211) 
SCM Land continued its efforts to lease this space, still 
without success. (R. 211) In March 1982, Norwest leased all 
but one room of Suite 606, further reducing SCM Land's net 
rental loss by $371 per month. (R. 212) In April 1982, 
Vesta Corporation leased the last room of Suite 606 again 
reducing the rental, this time by $190 per month. (R. 218) 
When Watkins & Faber's lease term ended in June 1982, only 
Suite 305 was vacant. (R. 208-218) Throuqh its efforts and 
by moving Norwest from Suite 305 to a portion of Suite 606, 
SCM Land was able to cut its rental loss from $21,546 to 
$15,037, a $6,509 savings. (Exhibit 7-P) 
In addition to this $15,037 rental loss, SCM Land spent 
$400 to partition Suite 606 for its new tenants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WATKINS & FABER'S EVIDENCE OF AN ALLEGED 
ORAL PROMISE TO MAKE A WRITTEN LEASE FOR 
ADDITIONAL SPACE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED. INSTEAD THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT ON LIABILITY FOR 
SCM LAND. 
(R. 219) 
Construing the evidence in derogation of the jury ver-
dict, Watkins & Faber argues that Fischer orally "agreed that 
he would enter into a written lease for additional space on 
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the Sixth Floor by at least December, 1979." (R. 314) 
Although it was never discussed, Watkins & Faber presumed 
that the term of this written lease for additional space 
would be at least two and one-half years. (R. 314; Exhibit 
2-P, ' lC). Simply put, Watkins & Faber claims an oral 
promise to make a written lease for at least a two and 
one-half year period. Whether characterized as consideration 
or a condition precedent, the alleged oral promise is the 
same and must be cognizable at law for Watkins & Faber to 
pursue a defense of either failure of consideration or the 
non-performance of a condition precedent. 
A. Fischer's Alleged Oral Promise to Make a Written 
Lease Is Void Under the Statute of Frauds. 
The Statute of Frauds governing realty leases states: 
Every contract for the leasing [of any land) for a 
period longer than one year, ••• shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to 
whom the lease • • • is to be made • • • • 
Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-3. In Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. 
Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1096 
(1953), this court ruled: 
[An) oral agreement to make a written lease is 
governed by the Statute of Frauds the same as if an 
oral lease was made. An oral agreement to make a 
contract which must itself be in writing is itself 
within the Statute of Frauds. 
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Thus the court there held that an oral contract to renew a 
lease for a five year term was void. 
The jury has already found that there was no agreement. 
Thus, the most Watkins & Faber can argue is that Fischer made 
an oral promise to make a written lease for additional 
space. This written lease was to be for a period longer than 
one year. Under Utah Mercur Gold this alleged oral promise 
must satisfy the Statute of Frauds or it is void. Since 
there was no writing evidencing this alleged oral promise, it 
is void. Being void, evidence of the alleged oral promise 
was inadmissible. Having admitted it, the trial court com-
mitted error. Instead of submitting Watkins & Faber's 
defense to the jury, the trial court should have granted SCM 
Land's motion for partial summary judgment and motion for a 
directed verdict on liability. Since the jury reached the 
proper result by rejecting Watkins & Faber's defense, the 
error was harmless and the judgment should be affirmed. 
Watkins & Faber's reliance on FMA Financial Corporation 
v. Hanson Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980) and Nielson 
v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah 1982), for the admissibil-
ity of the alleged oral promise is misplaced. Both are parol 
evidence cases. Even assuming the alleged oral promise is 
admissible as parol evidence, it still violates the Statute 
of Frauds. The test is not either the parol evidence rule or 
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the Statute of Frauds, but both. Having failed to satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds, Watkins & Faber's argument fails. 
B. Fischer's Alleged Oral Promise was Not Recorded and 
Is Therefore Unenforceable Aqainst SCM Land, a Bona 
Fide Purchaser. 
As defined in Utah Code Ann., S 57-1-1, a conveyance of 
an interest in realty includes a lease for a period longer 
than one year. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., S 57-3-3, such a 
lease is unenforceable against a subsequent good faith pur-
chaser for valuable consideration unless the lease is re-
corded. Fischer's alleged oral promise was to make a lease 
for a period longer than one year. Consequently, it must 
have been recorded to be enforceable against a subsequent 
purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. 
Since there was no writing, Watkins & Faber did not record 
their alleged interest. Thus, if SCM Land was a subsequent 
good faith purchaser for valuable consideration, the alleged 
oral promise is unenforceable against it. 
SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building for $3,200,000 
subsequent to the alleged oral promise. (R. 187) Thus SCM 
Land was a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration. 
When SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building, Watkins & 
Faber only occupied Suite 606 as provided in the July 1979 
written lease agreement. Neither the written lease agree-
ment, Suite 606 or Watkins & Faber's possession of Suite 606 
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gave SCM Land inquiry notice of an alleged oral promise to 
enter into a written lease agreement for space then occupied 
by another tenant. Thus, SCM Land purchased in good faith. 
Being a subsequent good faith purchaser for valuable con-
sideration, the unrecorded alleged interest of Watkins & 
Faber is not enforceable against SCM Land. Being unenforce-
able, evidence of the alleged oral promise was inadmissible. 
Having admitted it, the trial court committed error. Instead 
of submitting Watkins & Faber's defense to the jury, the 
trial court should have granted SCM Land's motion for partial 
summary judgment and motion for directed verdict on liabil-
ity. Since the jury reached the proper result by rejecting 
Watkins & Faber's defense, the error was harmless and the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
During the trial, Watkins & Faber argued that SCM Land 
had a duty to inquire of Watkins & Faber whether they claimed 
an unrecorded interest in space occupied by another tenant. 
The trial court properly rejected this argument. {R. 331) 
As explained by this court in Tolend v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 
P. 190 (1890), a purchaser is only on inquiry notice of those 
facts about which a prudent man might inquire based upon what 
he knows. The facts known by SCM Land would not make a pru-
dent man inquire whether Watkins & Faber had an oral promise 
to lease space then occupied by another tenant. Having 
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failed to satisfy the recording statute, Watkins & Faber's 
argument fails. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE 
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION DEFENSE SINCE A 
PROMISE TO AGREE IN THE FUTURE IS NUGATORY 
AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE CONSIDERATION FOR 
AN OTHERWISE ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. 
Watkins & Faber does not argue that the written lease 
agreement for Suite 606 is not binding on them. Rather they 
contend that under the parol evidence rule Fischer's promise 
to make a future agreement was an unwritten term of the writ-
ten lease agreement, that this term represented part of the 
consideration for the written lease, and that this considera-
tion failed. The trial court ruled that unless this oral 
term to agree in the future was an enforceable contract, the 
oral term was nugatory. Being nugatory, it cannot be consid-
eration and therefore cannot fail. 
The correctness of the trial court's ruling is elementary 
contract law. 
[U]nless an agreement to make a future contract is 
definite and certain upon all the subjects to be 
embraced, it is nugatory. To be enforceable, a con-
tract to enter into a future contract must specify 
all its material and essential terms and leave none 
to be agreed upon as the result of future negotia-
tions .••• If any essential term is left open for 
future consideration, there is no binding contract, 
and an agreement to reach an agreement imposes no 
obligation on the parties thereto. 
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17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts S 26. This principle is so elementary 
that this court saw no need to "multiply authority" on the 
proposition and simply stated: 
Where the parties have left an essential part of the 
agreement for future determination, it is no doubt 
correct to say that the contract is not complete. 
Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 P.133, 
135 (1926). 
Consistent with this law, the trial court submitted a 
special interrogatory to the jury on whether there was an 
oral contract to enter into a written lease agreement. The 
jury was properly instructed on mutual assent and essential 
terms. (Jury Instruction No. 17) After considering Watkins 
& Fa~er's evidence, against which SCM Land offered no evi-
dence, the jury concluded there was no oral contract. Thus 
the oral promise to make a future agreement was nugatory and 
not consideration. 
Watkins & Faber suggests that FMA Financial Corporation 
and Nielsen mandate an opposite result. As already dis-
cussed, these are parol evidence cases. They do not address 
the issue of promises to agree in the future as consideration. 
Watkins & Faber also argues that even if not specifically 
enforceable, the promise to agree in the future can still be 
the basis for rescission. This argument must fail. Hair-
splitting between enforceability and excuse is a distinction 
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without a difference. Both depend upon an oral promise to 
agree in the future. In either event the promise to agree 
must be cognizable at law to enforce the contract or excuse 
performance. When the jury determined it was not, the matter 
was set to rest. 
Even assuming the admissibility of the evidence support-
ing an oral promise to agree in the future, the promise was 
nugatory and not consideration. 
POINT III 
SINCE WATKINS & FABER RECEIVED WHAT THEY 
BARGAINED FOR IN THE WRITTEN LEASE AGREE-
MENT, THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. 
Assuming that an oral promise to make a future agreement 
can be consideration and that the parol evidence rule allows 
it to be a part of the written lease agreement for Suite 606, 
there was no failure of consideration. To have a failure of 
consideration, Watkins & Faber must have failed to receive 
what they bargained for. But what did they bargain for? 
First, they bargained for and received Suite 606. Second, 
they bargained for Fischer's promise, not for his performance 
of the promise. This they received as well. 
As explained at trial: 
Mr. Fischer asked me if I was ready to sign the 
lease, and I said, "No, not unless we have a promise 
of the space next door." And he said that was no 
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problem, that he would promise the space next door. 
(R. 296) [Emphasis added] 
Simply put, Faber said that if Fischer would give him a prom-
ise to make a future agreement, he would execute the written 
lease. Like many situations, the performance required was to 
give a promise. When the promise was given, Fischer's per-
formance was executed. Watkins & Faber even argued at trial 
and in its Appellant's Brief that the "oral promise for addi-
tional space" should have been treated "as consideration 
paid." (Appellant's Brief, p. 9, emphasis added) With the 
"consideration paid", Watkins & Faber performed their obliga-
tion by signing the written lease. Only the written terms of 
the lease agreement remained executory. Since those terms 
were fulfilled by the Landlord, there was no failure of con-
sideration. 
POINT IV 
SINCE FISCHER'S ORAL PROMISE WAS NOT 
BROKEN, THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERA-
TION. 
Assuming that the bargain not only required Fischer to 
give a promise, but also to perform the promise, only the 
failure to perform that promise gives rise to a failure of 
consideration defense. To this point, the argument has been 
premised on Watkins & Faber's characterization that the pro-
mise was to enter into a written lease for additional space 
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on the Sixth Floor by at least December, 1979. Since this 
written lease was never executed, Watkins & Faber argues 
failure of consideration. However, this view construes the 
evidence in derogation of the jury verdict. As the prevail-
ing party, SCM Land is entitled to have the evidence viewed 
in support of the verdict. When viewed in this light, the 
promise was not as characterized by Watkins & Faber. 
Watkins & Faber called as their first witness at trial 
Kenneth P. Swinton, Fischer's building manager. Swinton 
testified that Fischer promised that "when I.M.L. moved he 
would let Watkins & Faber have that [additional] space." (R. 
274) He also testified that there was no promise to evict 
I.M.L. so that Watkins & Faber could have the additional 
space. (R. 275) Althouqh Watkins & Faber claims that the 
written lease for this additional space was to have been exe-
cuted by December 1979, December came and went without the 
written lease or a demand from Watkins & Faber. (R. 238) 
Watkins & Faber made no demand because I.M.L. had not moved. 
These facts, together with Watkins & Faber's failure to put 
this "critical" promise in the written lease for Suite 606 
support the conclusion that Fischer's promise was to provide 
additional space when I.M.L. moved. Since I.M.L. did not 
move, the promise was not broken. Thus the jury's determina-
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tion that if there was an oral contract, it was not breached, 
precludes a failure of consideration defense. 
POINT V 
SINCE WATKINS & FABER FAILED TO ACT WITHIN 
A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE ALLEGED BREACH 
OF THE ORAL PROMISE, THERE WAS NO FAILURE 
OF CONSIDERATION. 
Again assuming that the bargain required Fischer's per-
formance of the promise and assuming that the promise was as 
characterized by Watkins & Faber, Watkins & Faber must show 
that they acted within a reasonable time after the alleged 
breach in order to have their performance excused. 
When December 1979 passed without a written lease for the 
additional space, Watkins & Faber failed to make any demand 
on Fischer for performance. (R. 238) To the contrary, 
Watkins & Faber never demanded of Fischer that he perform. 
(R. 238) Instead, Watkins & Faber waited nine months before 
making a demand and then made it on a subsequent purchaser 
that knew nothing of the oral promise and that had already 
leased the space to its longstanding occupant. Thus the 
jury's determination that if there was an oral contract, 
Watkins & Faber did not act within a reasonable time to 
rescind the written lease precludes a failure of considera-
tion defense. 
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POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDINGS 
THAT SCM LAND MITIGATED ITS DAMAGES BY MOV-
ING NORWEST FROM SUITE 305 TO SUITE 606. 
For seven months after Watkins & Faber vacated Suite 606, 
SCM Land tried unsuccessfully to relet their space. By 
October 1981 this accounted for a $1,458 monthly rental 
loss. To minimize this loss, SCM Land allowed an existing 
tenant out of its lease agreement for Suite 305 so that it 
could move to a portion of Suite 606. As a result of this 
move, SCM Land lost $717 monthly rentals for Suite 305 but 
gained $1,212 in rentals for that portion of Suite 606. This 
reduced SCM loss by $495 monthly. Five months later Norwest 
leased another portion of Suite 606 for $371 monthly, all of 
which reduced SCM Land's rental loss from Watkins & Faber's 
breach of the Lease Agreement. Had SCM Land not allowed 
Norwest to move, it would have suffered an additional rental 
loss of $5,939, all of which would have been damages. (Exhi-
bit 7-P, R. 200-218) 
At trial Watkins & Faber argued that SCM Land should not 
have allowed Norwest to move from Suite 305 to Suite 606. 
Since the move saved $5,939, the argument is difficult to 
understand. However, it is not difficult to understand what 
Watkins & Faber would have argued had SCM Land passed up the 
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opportunity to save nearly $6,000. In any event, the trial 
court allowed a special verdict on the issue: 
Under all the circumstances was it reasonable for 
plaintiff to allow Norwest Resource Consultants, 
Incorporated to vacate Suite 305 and move to Suite 
606 and then charge the rent loss from Suite 305 as 
damages against defendants? 
The jury answered "yes." (R. 336) Since the evidence sup-
ports this verdict, it should be upheld. 
Watkins & Faber argues that since Norwest's lease for 
Suite 305 would have expired in April 1982, the rental loss 
from Suite 305 for May and June 1982 should not be allowed. 
This argument has already been made to the jury and reject-
ed. It should be rejected again. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AT THE EXISTING LEGAL RATES WAS 
PROPER. 
SCM Land submitted a proposed judgment with prejudgment 
interest at ten percent per annum, the rate in effect after 
May 13, 1981. Watkins & Faber argued that the rate should be 
six percent as existed before May 14, 1981. The trial court 
ruled that the prejudgment rate would be six percent throuqh 
May 13, 1981 and ten percent thereafter. The trial court 
made the change which diminished prejudgment interest by $9. 
Although the bulk of SCM Land's damages arose after May 13, 
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1981, and the liability was affixed in 1983, Watkins & Faber 
argues that since the written lease was signed prior to May 
13, 1981, the prejudgment rate is six percent. 
This argument is premised on an unfounded assumption that 
Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 prohibits using a prejudgment inter-
est rate not in effect when the agreement was entered. 
Rather the statute, with its predecessor, simply reads that 
prejudgment interest is six percent until May 14, 1981 and 
ten percent thereafter. This has nothing to do with when the 
agreement was signed especially since the agreement does not 
even cover prejudgment interest. As this court ruled in 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979), the operative 
fact is when the amount became due. From then on SCM Land 
"is entitled to interest at the legal rate until payment is 
made." Scott v. Scott, 430 P.2d 580, 583 (Utah 1967). 
CONCLUSION 
In essence, this case presents a group of lawyers, who 
failed to protect their interests, trying to shift their 
losses to a good faith purchaser rather than to the person 
who allegedly caused them. As attorneys they could have 
easily put the alleged agreement in writing so that a good 
faith purchaser could have had notice of it. But they did 
not. As attorneys they could have then recorded the writing 
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to give constructive notice to a good faith purchaser. But 
they did not. As a matter of long-established public policy 
reflected in the Statute of Frauds and the Bona Fide Pur-
chaser Rule, they should have prevented the conflict. Havinq 
failed to do so, they should bear the loss, not a good faith 
purchaser. The law requires this and the jury has agreed. 
Even so, there was no breach of the alleqed promise to 
agree in the future. As lawyers should know, a promise to 
agree in the future cannot be consideration. Even if it 
could be, all that was asked prior to the execution of the 
written lease for Suite 606 was that a promise to agree be 
given--and it was. Furthermore, the promise was not breached 
since I.M.L. never moved. And even granting Watkins & Faber 
all of this, as the jury concluded, they did not act within a 
reasonable time after the alleged breach. 
In all respects the jury verdict and judgment should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 7-#1 day of September, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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